Scientific Theories and Their Irrationality Essay.
Category: Political Science
Please provide a well-thought-out and detailed response to this philosophy of science question. base the answer on these sources only please:
https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/5117/511751360027.pdf
Question
If scientific theories cannot be proven true, or shown to be probably true, then it is irrational to accept what any scientific theory says about the world. Scientific theories cannot be proven true, or show to be probably true. Therefore, it is irrational to accept what any scientific theory says about the world.
Length wise I need it to be a page and a half (1 & 1/2)
Scientific Theories and Their Irrationality
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Scientific Theories and Their Irrationality
It is rational to accept what any scientific theory says about the world since the experiments are unique. When other experiments are done using different participants and conditions, they may affirm the previous findings, improve on them while dismissing some. However, this does not mean that the previously completed scientific experiments are fake or do not hold any water (Elliott, 2015). Even though the scientific experiments may target specific approving hypotheses, it does not mean that they will all assume similar procedures and subjects. The differences in the subjects cause the difference in the findings and conclusions. What readers need to acknowledge is that it is tough to replicate scientific experiments in all aspects. Some of the factors will vary, and in turn, the results will vary; however, the deviance is slight. It is pretty hard for scientists to assume detailed studies ad findings in a scientific world since there are many variables specific to the individual scientific experiments.
Additionally, it is rational to accept scientific theories and what they say about the world since they also acknowledge room for changes and errors. The theories are hypotheses and philosophies that scientists formulate, and this means that any experiment that can prove the theories right or wrong is welcome. Therefore, it would be irrational to dismiss the theories since there is no guarantee that they are wrong. Instead, some of the consecutive scientific theories are likely only to point out the mistake. Others will affirm them, while others will develop an alternative approach to the issue (Bird, n.d.). Thus, dismissing the scientific theories means that the readers are ignorant of the little available information on a particular concept which is more irrational than giving the general theories the benefit of the doubt. Furthermore, the common knowledge points that the scientific theories are called theories since there is room for improvement and further affirmation.
According to philosophers, there is no single theory that scientists can apply across all scientific fields. One approach cannot satisfy all of the requirements of a given concept since no single view can do so. This explains why a variety of techniques and ideas are employed in an attempt to represent the same problem inside a single conceptual framework. For example, when it comes to comprehending human behaviour, there are several theories that scientists may utilize to explain the concept (Elliott, 2015). For example, some people will likely approach the topic from the same point of view as others, while others will take a different approach than they did. These theories may not always agree on the same subject, and as a result of this disagreement, they may reach various conclusions. Rather than implying that these notions are erroneous, it is more accurate to state that all of them are right and important to some degree at different times or from different viewpoints.
Reference
Bird, A. Understanding the Replication Crisis as a Base Rate Fallacy. Forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Elliott, S. (2015). Is The Scientific Method A Myth? Perspectives From The History And Philosophy Of Science. Universitat de València, Valencia, España. pp. 195-199.